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Abstract
Traditionally, the payment required for parking in regulated areas
has been made through parking meters. In the last years, several
applications which allow to perform these payments using a mobile
device have appeared.
In this paper we propose a privacy-preserving pay-by-phone
parking system offering the same privacy as the traditional paper-
based method even assuming an internal attacker with full access to
all the information managed by the system servers. Drivers’privacy
is preserved without requiring them to trust any party. Furthermore,
the system can tolerate that the mobile devices of drivers fall out of
coverage while their cars are parked.
1 Introduction
In the late 1920s, Roger W. Babson filed several parking meter patents [1].
In most proposals, after inserting coins into a pay station, a paper ticket to
be placed on the dashboard of the car is issued.
The massive deployment of smart devices has facilitated the development
of applications allowing such payments to be performed through the mobile
phone [2, 3, 4, 5]. Upon parking, the driver simply has to log into the mobile
∗This document is a postprint version of the paper presented at the 18th Workshop
on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES’19), November 11, 2019, London (United
Kingdom). DOI: 10.1145/3338498.3358638
1
app and indicate the car license plate number, the area of the city she has
parked in, and the expected duration. The amount to pay is then deducted
from a pre-paid balance, or charged directly on driver’s credit card.
Parking enforcement officers check the parking status of a car by typing
its plate number in a mobile device which indicates whether a payment is in
effect or not. This requires the presence of an online server, accessible from
officers’devices, with access to the data allowing to determine the payment
status of cars. This data is highly sensitive since it allows to infer private
information about drivers like their work schedules, hobbies, or even health
problems. To avoid unnecessary risks, the only information that should be
managed by the system is that allowing a parking officer to check if an
appropriate payment for a given parked car has been made or not.
Privacy is a key aspect in the design of secure systems and protocols
involving the mobility of people and vehicles. That is the case for electronic
transport tickets [6], pseudonym management in vehicular networks [7],
management of parking space [8, 9], or vehicle location proof systems [10].
To avoid security breaches from inside the service provider, pay-by-phone
parking systems should be designed by considering it a party which might try
to infer information about drivers’ parking habits. This excludes checking
the payment status of a car just from its plate number. In that case the
service provider could simply query the system periodically with a targeted
plate number and get accurate information about the time periods that the
traced car has been parked. Hence, the payment status of a car has to be
determinable only from one-time pseudonyms which can only be obtained by
a parking officer located close to the car1. This forces the need to include
some kind of on-board device providing one-time pseudonyms when requested
by a parking officer [11, 12].
1.1 Related Work
Nowadays there exist several pay-by-phone parking systems [2, 3, 4, 5], but
none of them addresses the privacy of drivers. These applications collect and
store accurate data about each parking operation so that the generation of
reports about parking habits can be done in a straightforward manner.
Recent research works [11, 12] have proposed systems that consider the
privacy of drivers. Both proposals share a similar system model. Pre-paid
e-coins are used for anonymous payments. In addition, an RFID-enabled
device is to be placed in cars and queried by parking officers when checking
1In this way the tracking of vehicles can not be done better than by patrolling the city
for collecting information about parked cars.
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the parking status of cars.
In [11], when a driver parks her car, an anonymous e-coin payment for
the expected parking duration is made. That payment is linked to a random
identifier which is stored in the on-board RFID device. When a parking
officer checks a car, he queries its on-board device to get the random identifier
which is then sent to the system server to determine whether a payment
linked to it has been done. At that time, the officer can link the car license
plate number to the current identifier, and from the data stored at the system
servers, that identifier can be linked to the start and end times of the parking
operation. Hence, the exact start and end times of the parking operation of
that car are determined.
The proposal in [12] provides better privacy: the parking officer, when
checking the parking status of a car, only obtains a boolean indicating
whether a payment for the checked car is in effect or not. That proposal
performs periodic micropayments for short-time intervals while the car is
parked. A payment can only be linked to a plate number after querying the
on-board device. In that case, the car can only be linked to the payment
performed for the current short-time interval so that the start and end times
keep secret.
The system proposed in [12] is currently the most complete privacy-
preserving pay-by-phone parking system. Unfortunately, if the driver’s
mobile device could not perform some of the micropayments due to a lack
of coverage, low battery or any other cause, the driver could be fined.
Our proposal provides all the features of [12] and, additionaly, solves the
mentioned drawback.
1.2 Contribution and Plan of this Paper
We propose a privacy-preserving pay-by-phone parking system in which, like
in [12], payments are performed for short-duration time slots using pre-paid
e-coins. In our proposal, a payment for each of the time slots composing
the expected parking time is done at the beginning of the parking operation,
eliminating the need to be connected all the time. Unused parking tickets can
be revoked so that the driver recovers the money corresponding to unused
time.
This first section has exposed the privacy concerns arising from the
deployment of pay-by-phone parking systems. Next, Section 2 explains the
system and adversary models together with the privacy requirements that
the system should fulfill. After that, our proposal is detailed in Section 3,
while Section 4 concludes the paper.
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2 System and adversary models
In the proposed system, payments are performed for short-duration time
intervals (5 or 10 min). As a result of paying for a given time slot, the driver
gets a parking ticket for that slot. When a parking operation begins, the
driver pays and gets a parking ticket for each of the time slots composing
the expected parking time. Parking tickets are paid using pre-paid e-coins2.
Unused tickets can later be revoked in advance.
This section describes the system and adversary models. After that, the
privacy requirements are detailed.
2.1 System Model
Our system is composed of the following actors:
1. Mobile application. It is run on the mobile device of drivers. It allows to
acquire pre-paid credit (in the form of e-coins), request parking tickets,
revoke unused tickets, and provide a parking ticket when requested by
a parking officer.
2. System server. It is an on-line platform accessed by the mobile
application to manage parking operations, and by parking officers to
check the payment status of cars.
3. On-board RFID device. It is placed inside cars and queried via RFID
by a parking officer during an inspection.
4. Parking officer. He patrols regulated parking areas, queries the on-
board RFID device of cars, and asks the system server about their
parking status.
5. Timestamp authority: It issues timestamps upon request by the system
server.
Use cases involving communication are enumerated next:
1. Application set-up. When a driver installs the app she is asked to
introduce the car plate number and a credit card required to acquire
pre-paid e-coins. Then, the app transmits the plate number and
2So as to preserve privacy, the employed e-coin system must be untraceable, like [13].
This excludes the use of transferable cryptocurrencies with a publicly available transaction
history. In our proposal we have had to design an ad-hoc e-coin system able to deal with
valued and no-valued e-coins.
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the current time to the on-board device. The on-board device then
generates an RSA key-pair and transmits the public key to the app.
This communication must require authentication by the driver. It is
performed via some short-range system like NFC or Bluetooth.
2. E-coin request. The app connects to the system server and requests
for a certain amount of e-coins which are pre-paid via credit card. The
price of each e-coin corresponds to the price of parking during a time
slot. As it will be explained later, e-coins can be valued or no-valued3.
3. Parking ticket generation. The app connects to the system server
and gets and stores parking tickets after performing the corresponding
anonymous payments in e-coins. This communication is done through
an anonymous channel to avoid linking parking payments from IP
addresses [14].
4. Parking inspection. A parking officer first queries the on-board device
of a car which responds with a signed message containing the current
time slot and its plate number. The officer forwards it to the system
server which will connect to the corresponding mobile device via the
“Parking ticket request” protocol. If the server gets a proper response,
the officer will be notified. Otherwise, the car will be fined.
5. Parking ticket request. The system server employs a push notification
service [15] to ask for a parking ticket to the app of a driver. If the
mobile device is connected, the response is immediate. Otherwise the
car will be fined. When connected again, if the mobile phone provides
a parking ticket valid for the time the fine was issued, the fine will be
canceled.
6. Parking ticket revocation. If a parking operation takes less time than
expected, the driver can revoke unused parking tickets. The app
connects to the server through an anonymous channel and revokes them
receiving valued e-coins in exchange.
2.2 Adversary Model
The considered adversary model equals the one described in [12]:
1. The mobile application and the on-board device can not be corrupted.
3No-valued e-coins are used to issue dummy parking tickets which mask the expected
duration of parking operations.
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2. System servers and parking officers will follow the protocol steps as
specified but may collaborate with an adversary by providing all the
data they have access to.
From the service provider point of view, drivers are untrusted parties
which might try to get parking time without paying for it.
2.3 Design Objectives
In this section we describe the design objectives. Privacy requirements are
equivalent to those in [12]. An additional requeriment regarding system
tolerance to mobile phones getting out of coverage has been added.
1. Parking tickets can only be linked to a car plate number as a result of
a parking status checking performed by a parking officer located close
to the car.
2. The information provided by a driver during a parking inspection only
allows to determine whether a parking ticket for the current time does
exist or not.
3. During a parking operation, the mobile app only needs an Internet
connection at the beginning and at the moment of revoking unused
parking tickets.
3 Our proposal
This section describes the procedures that compose the proposed system.
1. System parameters generation. This procedure must be run by the
service provider before deploying the service:
(a) Generate an RSA [16] key pair for the system server. Let VS be
the private key (only known to the server) and let PS be the public
key.
(b) Generate an RSA key pair for the timestamp server. Let VTSA
be the private key (only known to the timestamp server) and let
PTSA be the public key.
(c) Generate a tuple (p,q,g) of DSA [17] public set-up parameters
which are stored at the system server.
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Rationale. The system server will use its key pair to (blindly) sign
e-coins and parking tickets during their issuance preventing, in this
way, malicious drivers from being able to forge them. Timestamps will
be issued to avoid disputes regarding the revocation status of parking
tickets.
2. Application setup. A driver must install the app into her mobile device
and enter the car license plate number and a credit card number
(necessary to pay for the purchased e-coins). The app will then connect
to the on-board device and send the plate number and the current
time. The on-board device then sets its internal clock and generates
an RSA key pair: VD (private) and PD (public). The public key PD is
transmitted to the mobile app.
Rationale. The on-board device key pair will be used to generate signed
messages which are returned to parking officers after being queried by
them. Possession of such a signed message proves that a parking officer
was located close to the car when a parking inspection took place.
3. E-coin request. The app includes a wallet which stores e-coins that
are generated through a protocol run between the app and the system
server. A valued e-coin has a price while no-valued ones are free of
charge.
(a) A valued e-coin is generated as follows:
i. The mobile app performs a credit card payment for the
requested e-coin4.
ii. The app generates a DSA key pair VC/PC over the (p, q, g)
parameters.
iii. The app generates an even number x ∈ [0, (q − 1)/2)].
iv. The app computes H(PC ||gx) and asks the server to compute
an RSA blind signature on it.
v. The app gets SignS(H(PC ||gx)) as a result.
(b) A no-valued e-coin is generated as follows:
i. The app generates N DSA key pairs {VCi/PCi}0≤i<N and N
odd numbers {xi}0≤i<N ∈ [0, (q − 1)/2)].
ii. Then, the app computes {Hi = H(PCi||gxi)}0≤i<N and blinds
each Hi with a different blinding factor ri. All the N blinded
hash digests are sent to the server.
4E-coins will usually be generated in batch so that just a single credit card payment
for the overall amount will be done.
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iii. The server randomly chooses an index j ∈ [0, N−1] and sends
it to the app.
iv. For each i 6= j, the app sends ri, xi and PCi to the server.
v. The server unblinds the N − 1 hash digests Hi and checks
whether each Hi equals H(PCi||gxi). It also verifies that each
xi is odd and falls in the [0, (q − 1)/2)] range.
vi. If all the checkings are satisfied, the server blindly signs the
remaining blinded hash and returns the result to the app.
vii. The app gets SignS(H(PCj||gxj)) per result.
Rationale. The difference between valued and no-valued e-coins is the
parity of x. The system server, before issuing a no-valued e-coin must
check that the corresponding x is odd through the described cut-and-
choose technique. E-coins are blindly signed so that their issuance and
spending can not be related. Regardless of being valued or no-valued,
for each issued e-coin, the app stores a tuple:
{SignS(H(PC ||gx)), VC , x}.
4. Parking ticket generation. The driver has to issue a (valued) parking
ticket for each of the time slots that compose the expected parking
period. To hide its duration, the app always requests the same amount,
R, of tickets (embracing the maximum allowed parking time). The
tickets for slots in which the driver expects to be parked are paid with
valued e-coins. The remaining ones are issued with no-valued ones so
that no-valued dummy tickets are generated. This procedure is run
through an anonymous channel:
(a) The app takes a (valued or no-valued) e-coin
{SignS(H(PC ||gx)), VC , x},
and spends it by computing PC = g
VC and G = gx, and sending
SignS(H(PC ||G)), PC , and G to the server. Then, employing the
secret key VC the app signs a bitstring representing the current
time and sends the resulting signature SignC(H(CurrentT ime))
to the server.
(b) The server verifies the RSA signature SignS(H(PC ||G)) using its
public key PS, the signature SignC(H(CurrentT ime)) under the
e-coin public key PC and checks that the e-coin has not been spent
before.
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(c) The app determines the current time slot, Slot. Then it
generates N random keys {Ki}0≤i<N , and computes the set
{IDSloti = HMACKi(Slot||License)}0≤i<N . It also generates N
even numbers {xri}0≤i<N ∈ [0, (q − 1)/2)] and computes {G′i =
gx
′
i = gx+xri}0≤i<N .
(d) The app next computes the following N hash digests
{H(Slot||IDSloti||G′i)}0≤i<N , blinds each of them with a different
blinding factor ri, and sends the blinded results to the server.
(e) The server randomly chooses an index j ∈ [0, N − 1] and sends it
to the app.
(f) For each i 6= j, the app sends ri, xri, Slot and IDSloti to the
server.
(g) The server unblinds the N−1 hash digests Hi, computes G′i = G ·
gxri , and checks whether each Hi is equal to H(Slot||IDSloti||G′i).
It also verifies that each xri is even and falls in the [0, (q − 1)/2)]
range, and checks that Slot corresponds to a future time slot.
(h) If all the checkings are satisfied, the server blindly signs the
remaining blinded hash and returns the result to the app. Also,
the server stores:
{PC , G, SignS(H(PC ||G)), CurrentT ime,
SignC(H(CurrentT ime))}.
After running this process, the app gets a signature on the ticket,
namely SignS(H(Slot||IDSlot||gx′)). If x′ ∈ [0, q− 1] is even, the ticket
is valued. For each valued ticket, the app stores:
{SignS(H(Slot||IDSlot||gx′)), Slot,K, x′}.
Rationale. A parking ticket is valued or not depending on the parity
of x′. The system server must check that x (in the e-coin) and x′ (in
the ticket) have the same parity. Since x′ = x + xrj , this is achieved
by checking that xrj is even by means of the described cut-and-choose
technique.
5. Parking inspection. A parking officer approaches to the car and queries
its on-board device.
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(a) The on-board device, from its internal clock, determines the
current time slot, Slot, and sends it to the parking officer
together with the car plate number, License, and the signature
SignD(H(Slot||License)).
(b) The officer checks the received Slot and License values and
sends them together with SignD(H(Slot||License)) to the system
server.
(c) The server sends a push message to the app associated to License
and waits for a valid parking ticket (see the “Parking ticket
request” procedure) during some time.
(d) If the app does not properly respond to the request, the car is
fined and its driver receives a telematic notification.
Rationale. Possession of SignD(H(Slot||License)) proves that the
parking officer is located close to the car.
6. Parking ticket request. When the app is requested to prove a pending
inspection, the following procedure is run:
(a) The app:
i. Connects to the server and asks for the signature computed
by the on-board device (during the “Parking inspection”
execution) over Slot and License.
ii. Verifies the signature SignD(H(Slot||License)).
iii. If the previous verification is successful, it sends the ticket
SignS(H(Slot||IDSlot||gx′)), Slot, IDSlot, K, and x′ to the
server.
(b) The system server:
i. Checks the signature SignS(H(Slot||IDSlot||gx′)) over Slot,
IDSlot, and g
x′ under the server public key PS;
ii. Verifies that IDSlot equals HMACK(Slot||License)
iii. Checks that x′ ∈ [0, q−1] is even and has not been previously
revoked. In such a case, the timestamp issued during the
revocation, TimestampTSA(x
′), is returned (see the “Parking
ticket revocation” procedure).
(c) If all the previous checkings are satisfied, the parking officer is
informed about the validity of the provided ticket.
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If the app can not provide a valid ticket, the driver is fined. If the
driver paid for parking but her phone is out of coverage, she will also
be fined. In that case, the fine will be canceled when the mobile device
provides the parking ticket after getting connected again.
7. Parking ticket revocation. If the driver removes the car before than
expected, she can revoke unused valued tickets and recover the paid
amount. The app connects to the server through an anonymous
channel, and, for each valued parking ticket:
(a) The mobile app sends SignS(H(Slot||IDSlot||gx′)), Slot, IDSlot
and x′.
(b) The system server:
i. Validates the signature SignS(H(Slot||IDSlot||gx′)) over Slot,
IDSlot, and g
x′ under the public key PS.
ii. Checks that Slot corresponds to a future time slot.
iii. Checks that x′ is even and has not been revoked before. In
such a case, its TimestampTSA(x
′) would be returned as a
proof.
(c) If the parking ticket to be revoked is valid it requests the TSA to
timestamp x′. It stores x′ and TimeStampTSA(x′) in a database.
(d) Finally, a new valued e-coin is issued and stored by the app wallet
(by running the “E-coin request” procedure).
Rationale. Before revoking a ticket, the system server checks that it is
valued (x′ is even). The timestamp on x′ will serve, in case of dispute,
as a proof of its revoked status.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, a pay-by-phone parking system which guarantees the privacy
of drivers’ parking habits has been proposed. Drivers pay for a set of parking
tickets at the beginning of a parking operation and, if the parking operation
takes less time than initially expected, they can revoke unused tickets.
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